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Abstract
Quantum computers can break the RSA and El Gamal public-key cryptosystems, since they can
factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. If we believe that quantum computers will someday
become a reality, we would like to have post-quantum cryptosystems which can be implemented today
with classical computers, but which will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks.
In this article we show that the McEliece cryptosystem over well-permuted, well-scrambled linear
codes resists precisely the attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems are vulnerable—
namely, those based on generating and measuring coset states. This eliminates the approach of strong
Fourier sampling on which almost all known exponential speedups by quantum algorithms are based.
Specifically, we show that the natural case of the Hidden Subgroup Problem to which the McEliece
cryptosystem reduces cannot be solved by strong Fourier sampling, or by any measurement of a coset
state. We start with recent negative results on quantum algorithms for Graph Isomorphism, which are
based on particular subgroups of size two, and extend them to subgroups of arbitrary structure, includ-
ing the automorphism groups of linear codes. This allows us to obtain the first rigorous results on the
security of the McEliece cryptosystem in the face of quantum adversaries, strengthening its candidacy
for post-quantum cryptography.
1 Introduction
Considering that common public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and El Gamal are insecure against quan-
tum attacks, the susceptibility of other well-studied public-key systems to such attacks is naturally of fun-
damental interest. In this article we present evidence for the strength of the McEliece cryptosystem against
quantum attacks, demonstrating that the quantum Fourier sampling attacks that cripple RSA and El Gamal
do not apply to the McEliece system coupled with well-permuted, well-scrambled linear codes. While our
results do not rule out other quantum (or classical) attacks, they do demonstrate security against the hidden
subgroup methods that have proven so powerful for computational number theory. Additionally, we par-
tially extend results of Kempe et al. [8] concerning the subgroups of Sn reconstructible by quantum Fourier
sampling.
The McEliece cryptosystem. This public-key cryptosystem was proposed by McEliece in 1978 [11], and
is typically built over Goppa codes. There are two basic types of attacks known against the McEliece
cryptosystem: ciphertext only attacks, and attacks on the private key. The former is unlikely to work because
it relies on solving the general decoding problem, which is NP-hard. The latter can be successful on certain
classes of linear codes, and is our focus. In the McEliece cryptosystem, the private key of a user Alice
consists of three matrices: a k×n generator matrix M of a hidden q-ary [n,k]-linear code, an invertible k× k
matrix A over the finite field Fq, and an n× n permutation matrix P. Both matrices A and P are selected
randomly. Alice’s public key includes the matrix M∗ = AMP, which is a generator matrix of a linear code
equivalent to the secret code. An adversary may attack the private key by first computing the secret generator
matrix M, and then computing1 the secret row “scrambler” A and the secret permutation P.
There have been some successful attacks on McEliece-type public-key systems. A notable one is Sidel-
nokov and Shestakov’s attack [19], which efficiently computes the matrices A and MP from the public matrix
AMP, in the case that the secret code is a generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code. Note that this attack does
not reveal the secret permutation. An attack in which the secret permutation is revealed was proposed by
Loidreau and Sendrier [9]. However, this attack only works with a very limited subclass of classical binary
Goppa codes, namely those with a binary generator polynomial.
Although the McEliece cryptosystem is efficient and still considered (classically) secure [3], it is rarely
used in practice because of the comparatively large public key (see remark 8.33 in [12]). The discovery
of successful quantum attacks on RSA and El Gamal, however, have changed the landscape: as suggested
by Ryan [17] and Bernstein et al. [2], the McEliece cryptosystem could become a “post-quantum” alternative
to RSA.
Quantum Fourier sampling. Quantum Fourier Sampling (QFS) is a key ingredient in most efficient al-
gebraic quantum algorithms, including Shor’s algorithms for factorization and discrete logarithm [18] and
Simon’s algorithm [20]. In particular, Shor’s algorithm relies on quantum Fourier sampling over the cyclic
group ZN , while Simon’s algorithm uses quantum Fourier sampling over Zn2. In general, these algorithms
solve instances of the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) over a finite group G. Given a function f on G
whose level sets are left cosets of some unknown subgroup H < G, i.e., such that f is constant on each left
coset of H and distinct on different left cosets, they find a set of generators for the subgroup H .
The standard approach to this problem treats f as a black box and applies f to a uniform superposition
over G, producing the coset state |cH〉 = (1/√|H|)∑h∈H |ch〉 for a random c. We then measure |cH〉 in a
1Recovering the secret scrambler and the secret permutation is different from the Code Equivalence problem. The former finds
a transformation between two equivalent codes, while the latter decides whether two linear codes are equivalent.
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Fourier basis {|ρ , i, j〉} for the space C[G], where ρ is an irrep2 of G and i, j are row and column indices
of a matrix ρ(g). In the weak form of Fourier sampling, only the representation name ρ is measured, while
in the strong form, both the representation name and the matrix indices are measured. This produces proba-
bility distributions from which classical information can be extracted to recover the subgroup H . Moreover,
since |cH〉 is block-diagonal in the Fourier basis, the optimal measurement of the coset state can always be
described in terms of strong Fourier sampling.
Understanding the power of Fourier sampling in nonabelian contexts has been an ongoing project, and
a sequence of negative results [5, 13, 6] have suggested that the approach is inherently limited when the
underlying groups are rich enough. In particular, Moore, Russell, and Schulman [13] showed that over the
symmetric group, even the strong form of Fourier sampling cannot efficiently distinguish the conjugates of
most order-2 subgroups from each other or from the trivial subgroup. That is, for any σ ∈ Sn with large
support, and most pi ∈ Sn, if H = {1,pi−1σpi} then strong Fourier sampling, and therefore any measurement
we can perform on the coset state, yields a distribution which is exponentially close to the distribution
corresponding to H = {1}. This result implies that the GRAPH ISOMORPHISM cannot be solved by the
naive reduction to strong Fourier sampling. Hallgren et al. [6] strengthened these results, demonstrating
that even entangled measurements on o(log n!) coset states result in essentially information-free outcome
distributions. Kempe and Shalev [7] showed that weak Fourier sampling single coset states in Sn cannot
distinguish the trivial subgroup from larger subgroups H with polynomial size and non-constant minimal
degree.3 They conjectured, conversely, that if a subgroup H < Sn can be distinguished from the trivial
subgroup by weak Fourier sampling, then the minimal degree of H must be constant. Their conjecture was
later proved by Kempe, Pyber, and Shalev [8].
1.1 Our contributions
To state our results, we say that a subgroup H < G is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling if the
conjugate subgroups g−1Hg cannot be distinguished from each other or from the trivial subgroup by mea-
suring the coset state in an arbitrary Fourier basis. A precise definition is presented in Section 3.2. Since
the optimal measurement of a coset state can always be expressed as an instance of strong Fourier sampling,
these results imply that no measurement of a single coset state yields any useful information about H . Based
on the strategy of Moore, Russell, and Schulman [13], we first develop a general framework, formalized in
Theorem 4, to determine indistinguishability of a subgroup by strong Fourier sampling. We emphasize that
their results cover the case where the subgroup has order two. Our principal contribution is to show how to
extend their methods to more general subgroups.
We then apply this general framework to a class of semi-direct products (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2, bounding
the distinguishability for the HSP corresponding to the private-key attack on the McEliece cryptosystem,
i.e., the problem of determining A and P from M∗ and M. Our bound, given in Corrolary 9 of Theorem 8,
depends on the minimal degree and the size of the automorphism group of the secret code, as well as on
the column rank of the secret generator matrix. In particular, the rational Goppa codes have good values for
these quantities, i.e., they have small automorphism groups with large minimal degree, and have generator
matrices of full rank. In general, our result indicates that the McEliece cryptosystem resists all known attacks
based on strong Fourier sampling if its secret q-ary [n,k]-code (i) is well-permuted, i.e., its automorphism
group has minimal degree Ω(n) and size eo(n), and (ii) is well-scrambled, i.e., it has a generator matrix of
rank at least k−o(√n). Here, we assume qk2 ≤ n0.2n, which implies log |GLk(Fq)|= O(n logn), so that Alice
2Throughout the paper, we write “irrep” as short for “irreducible representation”.
3The minimal degree of a permutation group H is the minimal number of points moved by a non-identity element of H.
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only needs to flip O(n log n) bits to pick a random matrix A from GLk(Fq). Thus she needs only O(n logn)
coin flips overall to generate her private key.
While our main application is the security of the McEliece cryptosystem, we show in addition that our
general framework is applicable to other classes of groups with simpler structure, including the symmetric
group and the finite general linear group GL2(Fq). For the symmetric group, we extend the results of
[13] to larger subgroups of Sn. Specifically, we show that any subgroup H < Sn with minimal degree
m ≥ Θ(log |H|)+ω(logn) is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling over Sn. In other words, if the
conjugates of H can be distinguished from each other—or from the trivial subgroup—by strong Fourier
sampling, then the minimum degree of H must be O(log |H|)+O(logn). This partially extends the results
of Kempe et al. [8], which apply only to weak Fourier sampling.
We go on to demonstrate another application of our general framework for the general linear group
GL2(Fq), giving the first negative result regarding the power of strong Fourier sampling over GL2(Fq). We
show that any subgroup H < GL2(Fq) that does not contain non-identity scalar matrices and has order
|H| ≤ qδ for some δ < 1/2 is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling. Examples of such subgroups
are those generated by a constant number of triangular unipotent matrices.
Remark Our results show that the natural reduction of McEliece to a hidden subgroup problem yields
negligible information about the secret key. Thus they rule out the direct analogue of the quantum attack
that breaks, for example, RSA. Our results are quite flexible in this hidden-subgroup context: they apply
equally well to any HSP reduction resulting in a rich subgroup of GL2(Fq), which seems to be the natural
arena for the McEliece system.
Of course, our results do not rule out other quantum (or classical) attacks. Neither do they establish
that a quantum algorithm for the McEliece cryptosystem would violate a natural hardness assumption, as do
recent lattice cryptosystem constructions whose hardness is based on the Learning With Errors problem (e.g.
Regev [15]). Nevertheless, they indicate that any such algorithm would have to use rather different ideas
than those that have been proposed so far.
1.2 Summary of technical ideas
Let G be a finite group. We wish to establish general criteria for indistinguishability of subgroups H < G by
strong Fourier sampling. We begin with the general strategy, developed in [13], that controls the resulting
probability distributions in terms of the representation-theoretic properties of G. In order to handle richer
subgroups, however, we have to overcome some technical difficulties. Our principal contribution here is a
“decoupling” lemma that allows us to handle the cross terms arising from pairs of nontrivial group elements.
Roughly, the approach (presented in Section 3.2) identifies two disjoint subsets, SMALL and LARGE, of
irreps of G. The set LARGE consists of all irreps whose dimensions are no smaller than a certain threshold
D. While D should be as large as possible, we also need to choose D small enough so that the set LARGE
is large. In contrast, the representations in SMALL must have small dimension (much smaller than √D),
and the set SMALL should be small or contain few irreps that appear in the decomposition of the tensor
product representation ρ⊗ρ∗ for any ρ ∈ LARGE. In addition, any irrep ρ outside SMALL must have small
normalized character |χρ(h)|/dρ for any nontrivial element h ∈ H . If there are such two sets SMALL and
LARGE, and if the order of H is sufficiently small, then H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling
over G.
In the case G = GL2(Fq), for instance, we choose SMALL as the set of all linear representations and set
the threshold D = q−1. The key lemma we need to prove is then that for any nonlinear irrep ρ of GL2(Fq),
the decomposition of ρ ⊗ρ∗ contains at most two inequivalent linear representations. (Lemma 11). In the
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case G = Sn, we choose SMALL as the set Λc of all Young diagrams with at least (1− c)n rows or at least
(1− c)n columns, and set D = ndn, for reasonable constants 0 < c,d < 1. For this case, we use the same
techniques as in [13].
For the case G = (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2 corresponding to the McEliece cryptosystem, the normalized char-
acters on the hidden subgroup K depend on the minimal degree of the automorphism group Aut(C), where
C is the secret code. Moreover, |K| depends on |Aut(C)| and the column rank of the secret generator matrix.
Now we can choose SMALL as the set of all irreps constructed from tensor product representations τ × λ
of GLk(Fq)× Sn with λ ∈ Λc. Then the “small” features of Λc will induce the “small” features of this set
SMALL. To show that any irrep outside SMALL has small normalized characters on K, we show that any
Young diagram λ outside Λc has large dimension (Lemma 17).
2 Hidden Subgroup Attack Against McEliece Cryptosystems
2.1 An attack via the hidden shift problem
As mentioned in the Introduction, we consider the attack that involves finding the secret scrambler and
permutation in a McEliece private key.
Scrambler-Permutation Problem Given two k×n generator matrices M and M∗ of two equivalent linear
codes over Fq, the task is to find a matrix A ∈ GLk(Fq) and an n× n permutation P matrix such that M∗ =
AMP.
The decision version of this problem, known as CODE EQUIVALENCE problem, is not easier than
GRAPH ISOMORPHISM, although it is unlikely to be NP-complete [14]. The only known way to solve the
Scrambler-Permutation problem using quantum Fourier sampling is to reduce it to a Hidden Shift Problem,
which in turn can be reduced to a Hidden Subgroup Problem over a wreath product.
Hidden Shift Problem Let G be a finite group and Σ be some finite set. Given two functions f0 : G → Σ
and f1 : G→ Σ on G, we call an element s ∈ G a left shift from f0 to f1 (or simply, a shift) if f0(sx) = f1(x)
for all x ∈ G. We are promised that there is such a shift. Find a shift.
The Scrambler-Permutation Problem is reduced to the Hidden Shift Problem over group G = GLk(Fq)×
Sn by defining functions f0 and f1 on GLk(Fq)×Sn as follows: for all (A,P) ∈ GLk(Fq)×Sn,
f0(A,P) = A−1MP , f1(A,P) = A−1M∗P . (1)
Here and from now on, we identify each n× n permutation matrix as its corresponding permutation in Sn.
Apparently, AMP = M∗ if and only if (A−1,P) is a shift from f0 to f1.
2.2 Reduction from the hidden shift problem to the hidden subgroup problem
We present how to reduce the Hidden Shift Problem over group G to the HSP on the wreath product G ≀Z2,
which can also be written as a semi-direct product G2⋊Z2 associated with the action of Z2 on G2 in which
the non-identity element of Z2 acts on G2 by swapping, i.e., 1 · (x,y) = (y,x).
Given two input functions f0 and f1 for a Hidden Shift Problem on G, we define the function f : G2⋊
Z2 → Σ×Σ as follows: for (x,y) ∈G2,b ∈ Z2,
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f ((x,y),b) def=
{
( f0(x), f1(y)) if b = 0
( f1(y), f0(x)) if b = 1
(2)
We want to determine the subgroup whose cosets are distinguished by f . Recall that a function f on a
group G distinguishes the right cosets of a subgroup H < G if for all x,y ∈ G,
f (x) = f (y) ⇐⇒ yx−1 ∈H .
Definition. Let f be a function on a group G. We say that the function f is injective under right multiplica-
tion if for all x,y ∈ G,
f (x) = f (y) ⇐⇒ f (yx−1) = f (1) .
Define the subset G| f of the group G:
G| f def= {g ∈ G | f (g) = f (1)} .
Proposition 1. Let f be a function on a group G. If f distinguishes the right cosets of a subgroup H < G,
then f must be injective under right multiplication and G| f = H. Conversely, if f is injective under right
multiplication, then G| f is a subgroup and f distinguishes the right cosets of the subgroup G| f .
Hence, the function f defined in (2) can distinguish the right cosets of some subgroup if and only if it is
injective under right multiplication.
Lemma 2. The function f defined in (2) is injective under right multiplication if and only if f0 is injective
under right multiplication.
The proof for this lemma is straightforward on the case by case basis, so we omit it here.
Proposition 3. Assume f0 is injective under right multiplication. Let H0 = G| f0 and s be a shift. Then the
function f defined in (2) distinguishes right cosets of the following subgroup of G2⋊Z2:
G2⋊Z2| f = ((H0,s−1H0s),0)∪ ((H0s,s−1H0),1)
which has size 2|H0|2. Recall that the set of shifts is H0s.
To find a hidden shift from the hidden subgroup K = G2⋊Z2| f , just select an element of the form
((g1,g2),1) from K, then g1 must belong to H0s, which is the set of all shifts.
In the case of Scrambler-Permutation problem. Back to the Hidden Shift Problem over G = GLk(Fq)×
Sn reduced from the Scrambler-Permutation problem, it is clear that the input function f0 defined in (1) is
injective under right multiplication and that
H0 = GLk(F2)×Sn| f0 =
{
(A,P) ∈ GLk(F2)×Sn : A−1MP = M
}
.
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3 Quantum Fourier sampling (QFS)
3.1 Preliminaries and Notation
Fix a finite group G, abelian or non-abelian, and let Ĝ denote the set of (complex) irreducible representations,
or “irreps” for short, of G. For each irrep ρ ∈ Ĝ, let Vρ denote a vector space over C on which ρ acts so that
ρ is a group homomorphism from G to the general linear group over Vρ , and let dρ denote the dimension
of Vρ . For each ρ , we fix an orthonormal basis Bρ =
{
b1, . . . ,bdρ
}
for Vρ , in which we can represent each
ρ(g) as a dρ ×dρ unitary matrix whose jth column is the vector ρ(g)b j.
Viewing the vector space C[G] as the regular representation of G, we can decompose C[G] into irreps as
the direct sum
⊕
ρ∈ĜV
⊕dρ
ρ . This has a basis {|ρ , i, j〉 : ρ ∈ Ĝ,1≤ i, j ≤ dρ}, where {|ρ , i, j〉 | 1≤ i≤ dρ} is
a basis for the jth copy of Vρ in the decomposition of C[G].
Definition. The Quantum Fourier transform over G is the unitary operator, denoted FG, that transforms a
vector in C[G] from the point-mass basis {|g〉 | g ∈G} into the basis given by the decomposition of C[G].
For all g ∈ G,
FG |g〉= ∑
ρ ,i, j
√
dρ
|G|ρ(g)i, j |ρ , i, j〉 ,
where ρ(g)i j is the (i, j)-entry of the matrix ρ(g). Alternatively, we can view FG |g〉 as a block diagonal
matrix consisting of the block
√
dρ/|G|ρ(g) for each ρ ∈ Ĝ.
Notations. For each subset X ⊂ G, define |X〉= (1/√|X |)∑x∈X |x〉, which is the state of uniformly random
element of X in the point-mass basis. For each X ⊂ G and ρ ∈ Ĝ, define the operator
ΠρX
def
=
1
|X | ∑x∈X ρ(x) ,
and let X̂(ρ) denote the dρ ×dρ matrix block at ρ in the quantum Fourier transform of |X〉, i.e.,
X̂(ρ) def=
√
dρ
|G||X | ∑x∈X ρ(x) =
√
dρ |X |
|G| Π
ρ
X .
Fact. If X is a subgroup of G, then ΠρX is a projection operator. That is, (ΠρX)† = ΠρX and (ΠρX)2 = ΠρX .
Quantum Fourier Sampling (QFS) is a standard procedure based on the Quantum Fourier Transform to
solve the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) (see [10] for a survey). An instance of the HSP over G consists of
a black-box function f : G→{0,1}∗ such that f (x) = f (y) if and only if x and y belong to the same left coset
of H in G, for some subgroup H ≤G. The problem is to recover H using the oracle O f : |x,y〉 7→ |x,y⊕ f (x)〉.
The general QFS procedure for this is the following:
1. Prepare a 2-register quantum state, the first in a uniform superposition of the group elements and the
second with the value zero: |ψ1〉= (1/√|G|)∑g∈G |g〉 |0〉 .
2. Query f , i.e., apply the oracle O f , resulting in the state
|ψ2〉= O f |ψ1〉= 1√|G| ∑g∈G |g〉 | f (g)〉 = 1√|T | ∑α∈T |αH〉| f (α)〉
where T is a transversal of H in G.
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3. Measure the second register of |ψ2〉, resulting in the state |αH〉| f (α)〉 with probability 1/|T | for each
α ∈ T . The first register of the resulting state is then |αH〉 for some uniformly random α ∈ G.
4. Apply the quantum Fourier transform over G to the coset state |αH〉 observed at step 3:
FG |αH〉= ∑
ρ∈Ĝ,1≤i, j≤dρ
α̂H(ρ)i, j |ρ , i, j〉 .
5. (Weak) Observe the representation name ρ . (Strong) Observe ρ and matrix indices i, j.
6. Classically process the information observed from the previous step to determine the subgroup H .
Probability distributions produced by QFS. For a particular coset αH , the probability of measuring the
representation ρ in the state FG |αH〉 is
PαH(ρ) = ‖α̂H(ρ)‖2F =
dρ |H|
|G| Tr
(
(ΠραH)
†ΠραH
)
=
dρ |H|
|G| Tr
(
ΠρH
)
where Tr(A) denotes the trace of a matrix A, and ‖A‖F :=
√
Tr(A†A) is the Frobenius norm of A. The last
equality is due to the fact that ΠραH = ρ(α)Π
ρ
H and that Π
ρ
H is an orthogonal projector.
Since there is no point in measuring the rows [5], we are only concerned with measuring the columns.
As pointed out in [13], the optimal von Neumann measurement on a coset state can always be expressed in
this form for some basis Bρ . Conditioned on observing ρ in the state FG |αH〉, the probability of measuring
a given b ∈ Bρ is ‖α̂H(ρ)b‖2. Hence the conditional probability that we observe the vector b, given that
we observe the representation ρ , is then
PαH(b | ρ) = ‖α̂H(ρ)b‖
2
PαH(ρ)
=
‖ΠραHb‖2
Tr
(
ΠρH
) = ‖ΠρHb‖2
Tr
(
ΠρH
)
where in the last equality, we use the fact that as ρ(α) is unitary, it preserves the norm of the vector ΠρHb.
The coset representative α is unknown and is uniformly distributed in T . However, both distributions
PαH(ρ) and PαH(b | ρ) are independent of α and are the same as those for the state FG |H〉. Thus, in Step 5
of the QFS procedure above, we observe ρ ∈ Ĝ with probability PH(ρ), and conditioned on this event, we
observe b ∈ Bρ with probability PH(b | ρ).
If the hidden subgroup is trivial, H = {1}, the conditional probability distribution on Bρ is uniform,
P{1}(b | ρ) =
‖Πρ{1}b‖2
Tr
(
Πρ{1}
) = ‖b‖2dρ = 1dρ .
3.2 Distinguishability by QFS
We fix a finite group G and consider quantum Fourier sampling over G in the basis given by {Bρ}. For a
subgroup H < G and for g ∈ G, let Hg denote the conjugate subgroup g−1Hg. Since Tr(ΠρH) = Tr(ΠρHg),
the probability distributions obtained by QFS for recovering the hidden subgroup Hg are
PHg(ρ) =
dρ |H|
|G| Tr
(
ΠρH
)
= PH(ρ) and PHg(b | ρ) = ‖Π
ρ
Hg b‖2
Tr
(
ΠρH
) .
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As PHg(ρ) does not depend on g, weak Fourier sampling can not distinguish conjugate subgroups. Our
goal is to point out that for certain nontrivial subgroup H < G, strong Fourier sampling can not efficiently
distinguish the conjugates of H from each other or from the trivial one. Recall that the distribution P{1}(· | ρ)
obtained by performing strong Fourier sampling on the trivial hidden subgroup is the same as the uniform
distribution UBρ on the basis Bρ . Thus, our goal can be boiled down to showing that the probability distribu-
tion PHg(· | ρ) is likely to be close to the uniform distribution UBρ in total variation, for a random g ∈ G and
an irrep ρ ∈ Ĝ obtained by weak Fourier sampling.
Definition. We define the distinguishability of a subgroup H (using strong Fourier sampling over G), de-
noted DH , to be the expectation of the squared L1-distance between PHg(· | ρ) and UBρ :
DH
def
= Eρ ,g
[‖PHg(· | ρ)−UBρ‖21] ,
where ρ is drawn from Ĝ according to the distribution PH(ρ), and g is chosen from G uniformly at random.
We say that the subgroup H is indistinguishable if DH ≤ log−ω(1) |G|.
Note that if DH is small, then the total variation distance between PHg(· | ρ) and UBρ is small with high
probability due to Markov’s inequality: for all ε > 0,
Prg
[‖PHg(· | ρ)−UBρ‖t.v. ≥ ε/2]= Prg[‖PHg(· | ρ)−UBρ‖21 ≥ ε2]≤DH/ε2 .
In particular, if the subgroup H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling, then for all constant c > 0,
‖PHg(· | ρ)−UBρ‖t.v. < log−c |G|
with probability at least 1− log−c |G| in both g and ρ . Indeed, our notion of indistinguishability is inspired
by that of Kempe and Shalev [7]. Focusing on weak Fourier sampling, they say that H is indistinguishable
if ‖PH(·)−P{1}(·)‖t.v. < log−ω(1) |G|.
Our main theorem below will serve as a general guideline for bounding the distinguishability of H . For
this bound, we define, for each σ ∈ Ĝ, the maximal normalized character of σ on H as
χσ (H)
def
= max
h∈H\{1}
|χσ (h)|
dσ
.
For each subset S⊂ Ĝ, let
χS(H) = max
σ∈Ĝ\S
χσ (H) and dS = max
σ∈S
dσ .
In addition, for each reducible representation ρ of G, we let I(ρ) denote the set of irreps of G that appear in
the decomposition of ρ into irreps.
Theorem 4. (MAIN THEOREM) Suppose S is a subset of Ĝ. Let D > d2S and L = LD ⊂ Ĝ be the set of all
irreps of dimension at least D. Let
∆ = ∆S,L = maxρ∈L
∣∣S∩ I(ρ ⊗ρ∗)∣∣ . (3)
Then the distinguishability of H is bounded by
DH ≤ 4|H|2
(
χS(H)+∆
d2S
D
+
|L|D2
|G|
)
.
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Intuitively, the set S consists of irreps of small dimension, and L consists of irreps of large dimension.
Moreover, we wish to have that the size of S is small while the size of L is large, so that most irreps are likely
in L. In the cases where there are relatively few irreps, i.e. |S| ≪ D and |Ĝ| ≪ |G|, we can simply upper
bound ∆ by |S| and upper bound |L| by |Ĝ|.
We discuss the proof of this theorem in Section 5.
4 Applications
In this section, we point out some applications of Theorem 4 to analyze strong Fourier sampling over certain
non-abelian groups.
4.1 Strong Fourier sampling over Sn
In this part, we consider the case where G is the symmetric group Sn. Recall that each irrep of Sn is one-
to-one corresponding to an integer partition λ = (λ1,λ2, . . . ,λt) of n, which is associated with the Young
diagram of t rows in which the ith row contains λi columns. The conjugate representation of λ is the irrep
corresponding to the partition λ ′ = (λ ′1,λ ′2, . . . ,λ ′t ′), which is obtained by flipping the Young diagram λ
about the diagonal. In particular, λ ′1 = t and t ′ = λ1.
As in [13], we use Roichman’s upper bound [16] on normalized characters.
Theorem 5 (Roichman’s Theorem [16]). There exist constant b > 0 and 0 < q < 1 so that for n > 4, for
every pi ∈ Sn, and for every irrep λ of Sn,∣∣∣∣χλ (pi)dλ
∣∣∣∣≤ (max(q, λ1n , λ ′1n
))b·supp(pi)
where supp(pi) = #{k ∈ [n] | pi(k) 6= k} is the support of pi .
This bound works well for unbalanced Young diagrams. In particular, for a constant 0 < c < 1/4, let
Λc denote the collection of partitions λ of n with the property that either λ1n ≥ 1− c or
λ ′1
n
≥ 1− c, i.e., the
Young diagram λ contains at least (1− c)n rows or contains at least (1− c)n columns. Then, Roichman’s
upper bound implies that for every pi ∈ Sn and λ 6∈ Λc, and a universal constant α > 0,∣∣∣∣χλ (pi)dλ
∣∣∣∣≤ e−α ·supp(pi) . (4)
On the other hand, both |Λc| and the maximal dimension of representations in Λc are small, as shown in the
following Lemma of [13].
Lemma 6 (Lemma 6.2 in [13]). Let p(n) denote the number of integer partitions of n. Then |Λc| ≤ 2cn ·
p(cn), and dµ < ncn for any µ ∈ Λc.
To give a more concrete bound for the size of Λc, we record the asymptotic formula for the partition
function p(n) [4, pg. 45]: p(n) ≈ epi
√
2n/3/(4
√
3n) = eO(
√
n)n−1 as n→ ∞ .
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section, which is another application of Theorem 4.
Theorem 7. Let H be a nontrivial subgroup of Sn with minimal degree m, i.e., m = minpi∈H\{1} supp(pi).
Then for sufficiently large n, DH ≤ O(|H|2e−αm).
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Proof. Let 2c < d < 1/2 be constants. We will apply Theorem 4 by setting S = Λc and D = ndn. The
condition 2c < d guarantees that D > d2S , since dS ≤ ncn by Lemma 6.
First, we need to bound the maximal normalized character χS(H). By (4), we have χ µ(H)≤ e−αm for
all µ ∈ Ŝn \S. Hence, χS(H)≤ e−αm.
To bound the second term in the upper bound of Theorem 4, as ∆≤ |S|, it suffices to bound:
|S| · d
2
S
D
≤ 2cn · p(cn) · n
2cn
ndn
( by Lemma 6)
≤ eO(
√
n) ·n(2c−d)n ( since cn · p(cn) = eO(
√
n) )
≤ n−γn/2 for sufficiently large n, so long as γ < d−2c.
Now bounding the last term in the upper bound of Theorem 4:
|LD|D2
|Sn| ≤
p(n)n2dn
n! (since |LD| ≤ |Ŝn|= p(n))
≤ e
O(
√
n)n2dn
nne−n
(n! > nne−n by Stirling’s approximation)
≤ eO(n)n(2d−1)n
≤ n−γn/2 for sufficiently large n, so long as γ < 1−2d.
By Theorem 4, DH ≤ 4|H|2(e−αm +n−γn) .
Theorem 7 generalizes Moore, Russell, and Schulman’s result [13] on strong Fourier sampling over Sn,
which only applied in the case |H| = 2. To relate our result to the results of Kempe et al. [8] observe that,
since log |Sn| = Θ(n log n), the subgroup H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling if |H|2e−αm ≤
(n log n)−ω(1), or equivalently, if m≥ (2/α) log |H|+ω(logn).
4.2 Strong Fourier sampling and the McEliece cryptosystem
Our main application of Theorem 4 is to show the limitations of strong Fourier sampling in attacking the
McEliece cryptosystem. Throughout this section, we fix system parameters n,k,q of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem, and fix a k×n generator matrix M in a private-key of the system. Recall that the known possible
quantum attack against this McEliece cryptosystem involves solving the HSP over the wreath product group
(GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2 with the hidden subgroup being
K = ((H0,s−1H0s),0)∪ ((H0s,s−1H0),1) (5)
for some hidden element s ∈ GLk(Fq)×Sn. Here, H0 is a subgroup of GLk(Fq)×Sn given by
H0 =
{
(A,P) ∈ GLk(F2)×Sn : A−1MP = M
}
. (6)
Let Aut(M) denote the automorphism group of the linear code generated by M. Observe that every
element (A,P) ∈ H0 must have P ∈ Aut(M). This allows us to control the maximal normalized characters
on K through the minimal degree of Aut(M). Then applying Theorem 4, we show that
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Theorem 8. Assume qk2 ≤ nan for some constant 0 < a < 1/4. Let m be the minimal degree of the automor-
phism group Aut(M). Then for sufficiently large n, the subgroup K defined in (5) has DK ≤ O(|K|2e−δm) ,
where δ > 0 is a constant.
The proof of Theorem 8 follows the technical ideas discussed in the Introduction. The details appear in
Section 6. As qk2 ≤ nan, we have log
∣∣(GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2∣∣ = O(logn!+ logqk2) = O(n log n). Hence, the
subgroup K is indistinguishable if |K|2e−δm ≤ (n log n)−ω(1).
In general, the size of the subgroup K depends on the size of the automorphism group Aut(M) and the
column rank of the matrix M. To see this, we have |K| = 2|H0|2, and |H0| = |Aut(M)| × |Fix(M)|, where
Fix(M) denotes the set of matrices in GLk(Fq) fixing M, i.e.,
Fix(M) =
{
S ∈ GLk(Fq) | SM = M
}
.
To bound the size of Fix(M), we record an easy fact which can be obtained by the orbit-stabilizer formula.
Fact. Let r be the column rank of M. Then |Fix(M)|= (qk−qr)(qk−qr+1) . . . (qk−qk−1)≤ qk(k−r) .
Proof. WLOG, assume the first r columns of M are linearly independent, and each remaining column is a
linear combination of the first r columns. Consider the action of GLk(Fq) on the set of k× n matrices over
Fq. Under this action, the orbit of the matrix M, denoted Orb(M), consists of all k×m matrices over Fq such
that the first r columns are linearly independent, and each jth column, for j > r, consists of the same linear
combination of the first r columns as that of the jth column of the matrix M. Hence, the size of Orb(M)
equals the number of k× r matrices over Fq of column rank r. Thus, Orb(M) = (qk − 1)(qk − q) . . . (qk −
qr−1). On the other hand, Fix(M) is the stabilizer of M. By the orbit-stabilizer formula, we have
|Fix(M)|= |GLk(Fq)||Orb(M)| =
(qk−1)(qk−q) . . . (qk−qk−1)
(qk−1)(qk−q) . . . (qk−qr−1) = (q
k−qr)(qk −qr+1) . . . (qk−qk−1) .
Corollary 9. Assume qk2 ≤ n0.2n and the automorphism group Aut(M) has minimal degree Ω(n). Let r be
the column rank of M. Then the subgroup K defined in (5) has DK ≤ |Aut(M)|4q4k(k−r)e−Ω(n). In particular,
the subgroup K is indistinguishable if, further, |Aut(M)| ≤ eo(n) and r ≥ k−o(√n).
In the a case that the matrix M generates a rational Goppa code, then M has full rank and the auto-
morphism group Aut(M) is isomorphic to a subgroup of the projective linear group PGL2(Fq), provided
2 ≤ k ≤ n− 2, by Stichtenoth’s Theorem [21] (see Appendix B for more detailed background on rational
Goppa codes). This important property results in very good values we could desire for the automorphism
group Aut(M): we have |Aut(M)| ≤ |PGL2(Fq)| ≤ q3, and moreover,
Lemma 10. If M generates a rational Goppa code, the minimal degree of Aut(M) is at least n−3.
Proof. (sketch) Since Aut(M) is isomorphic to a subgroup of PGLk(Fq), the proof is based on the obser-
vation that any transformation in PGLk(Fq) that fixes at least three distinct projective lines must be the
identity.
By Corollary 9, the McEliece crytosystem coupled with rational Goppa codes resists known quantum
attacks based on strong Fourier sampling. Unfortunately, this cryptosystem is insecure due to the classical
attack by Sidelnokov and Shestakov [19] that recovers the secret scrambler A and the product MP, but does
not reveal the secret permutation P. Of course, our next goal will be to find other classes of linear codes
with which the McEliece cryptosystem would be secure against both classical and quantum attacks.
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4.3 Strong Fourier sampling over GL2(Fq)
In this simple application, we consider the finite general linear group G = GL2(Fq), whose structure as
well as irreps are well established [4, §5.2]. From the character table of GL2(Fq), which can be found in
Appendix C, we draw the following easy facts:
Fact. Let σ be an irrep of GL2(Fq). Then (i) For all g ∈ GL2(Fq), |χσ (g)| = dσ if g is a scalar matrix, and
|χσ (g)| ≤ 2 otherwise. (ii) If dσ > 1, then q−1≤ dσ ≤ q+1.
Let H be a subgroup of GL2(Fq). If H contains a non-identity scalar matrix, we have χσ (H) = 1 for all σ ,
making it impossible to find a set of irreps whose maximal normalized characters on H are small enough
to apply our general theorem (Theorem 4). For this reason, we shall assume that H does not contain scalar
matrices except for the identity. An example of such a subgroup H is any group lying inside the subgroup
of triangular unipotent matrices
{
T (b) | b ∈ Fq
}
, where T (b) :=
(
1 b
0 1
)
.
From the easy facts above for GL(2,q), it is natural to choose the set S in Theorem 4 to be the set of
linear (i.e., 1-dimensional) representations, and choose the dimensional threshold D to be q− 1. However,
since GL(2,q) has q− 1 linear representations, i.e., |S| = D, we can’t upper bound ∆ by |S|. We prove the
following lemma to provide a strong upper bound on ∆, which is, in this case, the maximal number of linear
representations appearing in the decomposition of ρ⊗ρ∗, for any nonlinear irrep ρ .
Lemma 11. Let ρ be an irrep of GL(2,q). Then at most two linear representations appear in the decompo-
sition of ρ⊗ρ∗.
The proof for this lemma can be found in Appendix C. Then applying Theorem 4 with S being the set
of linear representations, and L being the set of non-linear irreps of GL2(Fq), we have:
Corollary 12. Let H be a subgroup of GL2(Fq) that does not contain any scalar matrix other than the
identity. Then DH ≤ 28|H|2/q.
Proof of Corollary 12. Let S be the set of linear representations of GL2(Fq) and let D = q−1. Then in this
case, LD is the set of all non-linear irreps of GL2(Fq).
Since χσ (H)≤ 2/(q−1) for all nonlinear irrep σ , we have
χS(H)≤ 2/(q−1) ≤ 0.5/|H| .
To bound the second term in the bound of 4, we have ∆≤ 2 by Lemma 11 and dS = 1, thus
∆
d2S
D
≤ 2/(q−1)≤ 3/q .
As |G|= (q−1)2q(q+1) and |LD|= |S|= q−1, we have
|LD|D2
|G| =
(q−1)3
(q−1)2q(q+1) =
q−1
q(q+1)
< 1/q .
By Theorem 4, DH ≤ 4|H|2 (7/q) .
In particular, H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling over GL2(Fq) if |H| ≤ qδ for some
δ < 1/2, because in that case we have DH ≤ 28q2δ−1 ≤ log−c |GL2(Fq)| for all constant c > 0.
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Examples of indistinguishable subgroups. As a specific example, consider a cyclic subgroup Hb gener-
ated by a triangular unipotent matrix T (b) for any b 6= 0. Since T (b)k = T (kb) for any integer k ≥ 0, the
order of Hb is the least positive integer k such that kb = 0. In particular, the order of Hb equals the character-
istic of the finite field Fq. Suppose q = pn for some prime number p and n > 2. Then Fq has characteristic
p, and hence, |Hb|= p. By Corollary 12, we have DHb ≤ O(p2−n).
Similarly, consider a subgroup Ha,b generated by two distinct non-identity elements T (a) and T (b).
Since elements of Ha,b are of the form T (ka+ ℓb) for k, ℓ ∈ {0,1, . . . , p−1}, we have |Ha,b| ≤ p2. Thus,
the distinguishability of Ha,b using strong Fourier sampling over GL2(Fpn) is O(p4−n). Clearly, both Hb and
Ha,b are indistinguishable, for n sufficiently large. More generally, any subgroup generated by a constant
number of triangular unipotent matrices is indistinguishable.
5 Bounding distinguishability
We now present the proof for the main theorem (Theorem 4) in details. Fixing a nontrivial subgroup H < G,
we want to upper bound DH . Let us start with bounding the expectation over the random group element
g ∈G, for a fixed irrep ρ ∈ Ĝ:
EH(ρ) def= Eg
[‖PHg(· | ρ)−UBρ‖21] .
Obviously we always have EH(ρ)≤ 4. More interestingly, we have
EH(ρ) = Eg
( ∑
b∈Bρ
∣∣∣∣PHg(b | ρ)− 1dρ
∣∣∣∣
)2
≤ Eg
[
dρ ∑
b∈Bρ
(
PHg(b | ρ)− 1dρ
)2]
(by Cauchy-Schwarz)
= dρ ∑
b∈Bρ
Varg[PHg(b | ρ)] (since Eg[PHg(b | ρ)] = 1dρ )
=
dρ
Tr(ΠρH)2
∑
b∈Bρ
Varg
[‖ΠρHg b‖2] . (7)
The equation Eg[PHg(b | ρ)] = 1/dρ (Proposition 18 in Appendix A) can be shown using Schur’s lemma.
From (7), we are motivated to bound the variance of ‖ΠρHg b‖2 when g is chosen uniformly at random.
We provide an upper bound that depends on the projection of the vector b⊗b∗ onto irreducible subspaces
of ρ⊗ρ∗, and on maximal normalized characters of σ on H for all irreps σ appearing in the decomposition
of ρ ⊗ρ∗. Recall that the representation ρ ⊗ρ∗ is typically reducible and can be written as an orthogonal
direct sum of irreps ρ⊗ρ∗ =⊕σ∈Ĝ aσ σ , where aσ ≥ 0 is the multiplicity of σ . Then I(ρ⊗ρ∗) consists of
σ with aσ > 0, and we let Πρ⊗ρ
∗
σ denote the projection operator whose image is aσ σ , that is, the subspace
spanned by all copies of σ . Our upper bound given in Lemma 13 below generalizes the bound given in
Lemma 4.3 of [13], which only applies to subgroups H of order 2.
Lemma 13. Let ρ be an irrep of G. Then for any vector b ∈Vρ ,
Varg
[‖ΠρHg b‖2]≤ ∑
σ∈I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
χσ (H)
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 .
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Proof of Lemma 13. Fix a vector b∈Vρ . To simplify notations, we shall write Πg as shorthand for ΠρHg , and
write gb for ρ(g)b. For any g ∈G, we have
‖Πgb‖2 = 〈Πgb,Πgb〉= 〈b,Πgb〉
=
1
|H|
(
〈b,b〉+ ∑
h∈H\{1}
〈
b,g−1hgb
〉)
.
Let Sg = ∑h∈H\{1}
〈
b,g−1hgb
〉
. Then
‖Πgb‖2 = 1|H|
(‖b‖2 +Sg) and Sg = |H|‖Πgb‖2−‖b‖2 .
It follows that Sg is real, and that
‖Πgb‖4 = 1|H|2
(‖b‖4 +2‖b‖2Sg +S2g) .
We have
Eg
[‖Πgb‖4]= 1|H|2 (‖b‖4 +2‖b‖2Eg[Sg]+Eg[S2g]) (8)
Eg
[‖Πgb‖2]2 = 1|H|2 (‖b‖2 +Eg[Sg])2
=
1
|H|2
(
‖b‖4 +2‖b‖2Eg[Sg]+Eg[Sg]2
)
(9)
Subtracting (8) by (9) yields
Varg
[‖Πgb‖2]= Eg[‖Πgb‖4]−E[‖Πgb‖2]2
=
1
|H|2
(
Eg
[
S2g
]−Eg[Sg]2)≤ 1|H|2Eg[S2g] .
To bound the variance, we upper bound S2g for all g ∈G. Since Sg is real, applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity, we have
S2g =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑h∈H\{1}
〈
b,g−1hgb
〉∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ (|H|−1)
(
∑
h∈H\{1}
∣∣〈b,g−1hgb〉∣∣2) .
Proving similarly to Lemma 4.2 in [13], one can express the second moment of the inner product〈
b,g−1hgb
〉
in terms of the projection of b⊗ b∗ into the irreducible constituents of the tensor product
representation ρ⊗ρ∗. Specifically, for any h ∈G, we have
Eg
[|〈b,g−1hgb〉 |2]= ∑
σ∈I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
χσ (h)
dσ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 .
It follows that
Varg
[‖ΠρHg b‖2]≤ 1|H|
(
∑
h∈H\{1}
Eg
[∣∣〈b,g−1hgb〉∣∣2])≤ ∑
σ∈I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
χσ (H)
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 .
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Back to our goal of bounding EH(ρ) using the bound in Lemma 13, the strategy will be to separate irreps
appearing in the decomposition of ρ⊗ρ∗ into two groups, those with small dimension and those with large
dimension, and treat them differently. If dσ is large, we shall rely on bounding χσ (H). If dσ is small, we
shall control the projection given by Πρ⊗ρ∗σ using the following lemma which was proved implicitly in [13]
(its proof is also given in Appendix):
Lemma 14. For any irrep σ , we have ∑b∈Bρ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ d2σ .
The method discussed above for bounding EH(ρ) is culminated into Lemma 15 below.
Lemma 15. Let ρ ∈ Ĝ be arbitrary and S⊂ Ĝ be any subset of irreps that does not contain ρ . Then
EH(ρ)≤ 4|H|2
(
χS(H)+ |S∩ I(ρ⊗ρ∗)|
d2S
dρ
)
.
Proof of Lemma 15. Combining Inequality (7) and Lemmas 13 give
EH(ρ)≤
dρ
Tr(ΠρH)2
∑
σ∈I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
χσ (H) ∑
b∈Bρ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 .
Now we split additive items in the above upper bound into two groups separated by the set S. For the first
group (large dimension),
∑
σ∈S∩Ĝρ⊗ρ∗
χσ (H) ∑
b∈Bρ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ χS(H) ∑
b∈Bρ
∑
σ∈I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ χS(H)dρ .
For the second group (small dimension),
∑
σ∈S∩I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
χσ (H) ∑
b∈Bρ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ ∑
σ∈S∩I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
χσ (H)d2σ (by Lemma 14)
≤ ∑
σ∈S∩I(ρ⊗ρ∗)
d2σ (since χσ (H)≤ 1)
≤ |S∩ I(ρ⊗ρ∗)|d2S .
Summing the last bounds for the two groups yields
EH(ρ)≤
(
dρ
Tr(ΠρH)
)2(
χS(H)+ |S∩ I(ρ⊗ρ∗)|
d2S
dρ
)
.
On the other hand, since EH(ρ) ≤ 4, we can assume H2χS(H) ≤ 1, and thus χS(H)≤ 1|H|2 ≤ 12|H| . Hence,
we have
Tr(ΠρH)
dρ
=
1
|H|
(
1+ ∑
h∈H\{1}
χρ(h)
dρ
)
≥ 1|H| − χρ(H)≥
1
2|H| ,
where the last inequality is due to χρ(H)≤ χS(H)≤ 12|H| . This completes the proof.
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To apply this lemma, we should choose the subset S such that d2S ≪ dρ , that is, S should consist of small
dimensional irreps. Then applying Lemma 15 for all irreps ρ of large dimension, we can prove our general
main theorem straightforwardly.
Proof of Theorem 4: For any ρ ∈ L, since dρ ≥ D > d2S , we must have ρ 6∈ S. By Lemma 15,
EH(ρ)≤ 4|H|2
(
χS(H)+∆
d2S
D
)
for all ρ ∈ L .
Combining this with the fact that EH(ρ)≤ 4 for all ρ 6∈ L, we obtain
DH = Eρ [EH(ρ)]≤ 4|H|2
(
χS(H)+∆
d2S
D
)
+4Prρ [ρ 6∈ L] .
To complete the proof, it remains to bound Prρ [ρ 6∈ L]. Since Tr(ΠρH)≤ dρ , we have
P(ρ) = dρ |H||G| Tr(Π
ρ
H)≤
d2ρ |H|
|G| .
Since dρ < D for all ρ ∈ Ĝ\L, it follows that
Prρ [ρ 6∈ L] = ∑
ρ 6∈L
P(ρ)≤ |L|D
2|H|
|G| ≤
|L|D2|H|2
|G| .
6 Strong Fourier sampling over (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2
This section devotes to the proof of Theorem 8 which establishes the limitation of strong Fourier sampling in
breaking the McEliece cryptosystem. The goal is to bound the distinguishability of the subgroup K defined
in (5) of the wreath product (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2.
6.1 Normalized characters for G ≀Z2
Firstly, we consider quantum Fourier sampling over the wreath product G ≀Z2, for a general group G, with a
hidden subgroup of the form
K = ((H0,s−1H0s),0)∪ ((H0s,s−1H0),1)< G ≀Z2
for some subgroup H0 < G and some element s ∈ G. Again, the first thing we need to understand is the
maximal normalized characters on K. Recall that all irreducible characters of G ≀Z2 are constructed in the
following ways:
1. Each unordered pair of two non-isomorphic irreps σ ,ρ ∈ Ĝ gives rise to an irrep of G ≀Z2, denoted
{ρ ,σ}, with character given by:
χ{ρ ,σ}((x,y),b) =
{
χρ(x)χσ (y)+ χρ(y)χσ (x) if b = 0
0 if b = 1 .
The dimension of representation {ρ ,σ} is equal to χ{ρ ,σ}((1,1),0) = 2dρ dσ .
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2. Each irrep ρ ∈ Ĝ gives rise to two irreps of G ≀Z2, denoted {ρ} and {ρ}′, with characters given by:
χ{ρ}((x,y),b) =
{
χρ(x)χρ(y) if b = 0
χρ(xy) if b = 1
χ{ρ}′((x,y),b) =
{
χρ(x)χρ(y) if b = 0
−χρ(xy) if b = 1 .
Both representations {ρ} and {ρ}′ have the same dimension equal d2ρ .
Clearly, the number of irreps of G ≀Z is equal to |Ĝ|2/2+3|Ĝ|/2, which is no more than |Ĝ|2 as long as
G has at least three irreps. Now it is easy to determine the maximal normalized characters on subgroup K.
Proposition 16. For non-isormorphic irreps ρ ,σ ∈ Ĝ,
χ{ρ ,σ}(K)≤ χρ(H0)χσ (H0) .
For irrep ρ ∈ Ĝ,
χ{ρ}(K) = χ{ρ}′(K) = max
{
χρ(H0)2,1/dρ
}
.
So to bound the maximal normalized characters over K, we can turn to bounding the normalized charac-
ters on the subgroup H0 and the dimension of an irrep of G.
6.2 Normalized characters for (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2
Recall that for the case of attacking McEliece cryptosystem, we have G = GLk(Fq)×Sn and every element
(A,P) ∈H0 has P ∈ Aut(M).
For τ ∈ ĜLk(Fq) and λ ∈ Ŝn, let τ × λ denote the tensor product as a representation of GLk(Fq)× Sn.
Those tensor product representations τ×λ are all irreps of GLk(Fq)×Sn. Since χτ×λ (Spi ,pi) = χτ(Spi)χλ (pi)
and χτ(Spi)≤ 1 for all pi ∈ Sn, we have
χτ×λ (H0)≤ χλ (Aut(M)) .
As in the treatment for the symmetric group, we can bound the maximal normalized character χλ (Aut(M))
based on the minimum support of non-identity elements in Aut(M), for any λ ∈ Ŝn \Λc.
To complete bounding the maximal normalized characters on the subgroup K, it remains to bound the
dimension of a representation τ×λ of the group GLk(Fq)× Sn with λ ∈ Ŝn \Λc. Since the dimension of
τ×λ is
dτ×λ = dτ dλ ≥ dλ ,
we prove the following lower bound for dλ .
Lemma 17. Let 0 < c ≤ 1/6 be a constant. Then there is a constant β > 0 depending only on c such that
for sufficiently large n and for λ ∈ Ŝn \Λc,
dλ ≥ eβn .
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Proof of Lemma 17. Consider an integer partition of n, λ =(λ1, . . . ,λt), with both λ1 and t less than (1−c)n.
Let λ ′ = (λ ′1, . . . ,λ ′λ1) be the conjugate of λ , where t = λ ′1 ≥ λ ′2 ≥ . . .≥ λ ′λ1 and ∑i λ ′i = n. WLOG, assume
λ ′1 ≤ λ1. We label all the cells of the Young diagram of shape λ as c1, . . . ,cn, in which ci is the ith cell from
the left of the first row, for 1≤ i ≤ λ1.
The dimension of λ is determined by the hook length formula:
dλ =
n!
Hook(λ ) , Hook(λ ) =
n
∏
i=1
hook(ci) ,
where hook(ci) is the number of cells appearing in either the same column or the same row as the cell ci,
excluding those that are above or the the left of ci. In particular,
hook(ci) = λ1− i+λ ′i for 1≤ i ≤ λ1.
If λ1 ≤ cn, we have hook(ci)≤ t +λ1 ≤ 2cn for all i, thus
dλ ≥
n!
(2cn)n
≥ n
n
en(2cn)n
≥
(
3
e
)n
≥ eβn .
Now we consider the case cn < λ1 < (1− c)n. Let ˜λ = (λ2, . . . ,λt), this is an integer partition of n−λ1
whose Young diagram is obtained by removing the first row of λ . Applying the hook length formula for ˜λ
and the fact that d
˜λ ≥ 1 gives us:
Hook(˜λ ) = (n−λ1)!d
˜λ
≤ (n−λ1)! .
Then we have
Hook(λ ) = Hook(˜λ )
λ1∏
i=1
hook(ci)≤ (n−λ1)!
λ1∏
i=1
hook(ci) .
On the other hand, we have
λ1∏
i=1
hook(ci) =
λ1∏
i=1
(λ1− i+λ ′i )
= λ1!
λ1∏
i=1
(
1+ λ
′
i −1
λ1− i+1
)
≤ λ1!exp
(
λ1∑
i=1
λ ′i −1
λ1− i+1
)
(since 1+ x≤ ex for all x).
To upper bound the exponent in the last equation, we use Chebyshev’s sum inequality, which states that for
any increasing sequence a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . . ≥ ak and any decreasing sequence b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bk or real num-
bers, we have k ∑ki=1 aibi ≤
(
∑ki=1 ai
)(
∑ki=1 bi
)
. Since the sequence {λ ′i −1} is increasing and the sequence
{1/(λ1− i+1)} is decreasing, we get
λ1∑
i=1
λ ′i −1
λ1− i+1 ≤
∑λ1i=1(λ ′i −1)
λ1
(
λ1∑
i=1
1
λ1− i+1
)
=
n−λ1
λ1
(
λ1∑
i=1
1
i
)
≤ 1
c
(
λ1∑
i=1
1
i
)
(since λ1 > cn) .
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Let r be a constant such that 1 < r/c < cn. Bounding 1/i ≤ 1 for all i ≤ r/c and bounding 1/i ≤ c/r for all
i > r/c yields
λ1∑
i=1
1
i
≤ r
c
+
cλ1
r
.
Putting the pieces together, we get
dλ ≥
n!
(n−λ1)!λ1!eλ1/r+r/c2
=
(
n
λ1
)
e−λ1/r−r/c
2
≥
(
n
λ1
)λ1
e−λ1/r−r/c
2
≥
(
e−1/r
1− c
)λ1
e−r/c
2 (since λ1 < (1− c)n) .
Let 0 < δ < ln 11−c be a constant and choose r large enough so that e−1/r ≥ (1− c)eδ . Then
dλ ≥ eδλ1−r/c
2 ≥ eδcn−r/c2 ≥ eβn .
Remark The lower bound in Lemma 17 is essentially tight. To see this, consider the hook of width (1−c)n
and of depth cn. This hook has dimension roughly equal
(
n
cn
)
, which is no more than (e/c)cn.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 8
We are ready to prove Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 8. To apply Theorem 4, let 0 < c < min{1/6,1/4−a} be a constant and S be the set
of irreps of (GLk(Fq)× Sn) ≀Z2 of the forms {τ×λ ,η×µ}, {τ ×λ}, {τ×λ}′ with τ ,η ∈ ĜLk(Fq) and
λ ,µ ∈ Λc, where Λc is mentioned in Section 4.1. Firstly, we need upper bounds for χS(K), |S|, and dS.
Since Aut(M) has minimal degree m, by Inequality (4) in Section 4.1, we have for all λ ∈ Ŝn \Λc,
χλ (Aut(M))≤ e−αm .
Combining with Lemma 17 yields
χS(K)≤max
{
e−2αm,e−βn
}
≤ e−δm ,
for some constant δ > 0 (we can set δ = min{2α ,β}).
Since
∣∣∣ĜLk(Fq)∣∣∣≤ ∣∣GLk(Fq)∣∣≤ qk2 and by Lemma 6, we have
|S| ≤
∣∣∣ĜLk(Fq)∣∣∣2 |Λc|2 ≤ q2k2 eO(√n) .
To bound dS, we start with bounding the dimension of each representation in S. A representation {τ×λ ,η×µ}
in S has dimension
2dτ×λ dη×µ = 2dτ dλ dη dµ ≤ 2dτ dη n2cn ≤ 2qk
2
n2cn ,
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where the first inequality follows Lemma 6. The last inequality holds because d2τ ≤∑ρ∈ ̂GLk(Fq) d
2
ρ = |GLk(Fq)|
for any τ ∈ ĜLk(Fq). Similarly, a representation {τ×λ} or {τ×λ}′ in S has dimension d2τ×λ ≤ qk
2
n2cn.
Hence, the maximal dimension of a representation in the set S is
dS ≤ 2qk2 n2cn .
Let 4a+4c < d < 1 be a constant and let γ1 be any constant such that 0 < γ1 < d−4c−4a. Now we set the
dimension threshold D = ndn. From the upper bounds on |S| and dS, we get
|S|d
2
S
D
≤ 4q4k2 eO(
√
n)n(4c−d)n
≤ 4eO(
√
n)n(4a+4c−d)n (since qk2 ≤ nan)
≤ n−γ1n for sufficiently large n.
Let L be the set of all irreps of (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2 of dimension at least D. Bounding |L| by the number
of irreps of (GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2, which is no more than square of the number of irreps of GLk(Fq)×Sn, we
have
|L| ≤
∣∣∣ĜLk(Fq)∣∣∣2 ∣∣∣Ŝn∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣GLk(Fq)∣∣2 p(n)2 .
Hence, for sufficiently large n,
|L|D2∣∣(GLk(Fq)×Sn) ≀Z2∣∣ ≤
∣∣GLk(Fq)∣∣2 p(n)2n2dn
2
∣∣(GLk(Fq)∣∣2 |Sn|2 = p(n)
2n2dn
2(n!)2
≤ e
O(
√
n)n2dn
2n2ne−2n
≤ eO(n)n2(d−1)n ≤ n−γ2n so long as γ2 < 2(1−d).
By Theorem 4, we have
DK ≤ 4|K|2(e−δm +n−γ1n +n−γ2n)≤ 4|K|2(e−δm +n−γn) ,
for some constant γ > 0. This completes the proof.
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Appendices
A Supplemental proofs for the main theorem
Proposition 18. Let H < G and g be chosen from G uniformly at random. Then for ρ ∈ Ĝ and b ∈ Bρ ,
Eg[PHg(b | ρ)] = 1/dρ .
Proof. Schur’s lemma asserts that if ρ is irreducible, the only matrices which commute with ρ(g) for all g
are the scalars. Hence,
Eg
[
ΠρHg
]
=
1
|G| ∑g∈G ρ
†(g)ΠρH ρ(g) =
Tr(ΠρH)
dρ
1dρ ,
which implies that
Eg
[‖ΠρHg b‖2]= Eg[〈b,ΠρHg b〉]= 〈b,Eg[ΠρHg]b〉= Tr(ΠρH)dρ .
A.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof of Lemma 14. Let Lσ be the subspace of ρ⊗ρ∗ consisting of all copies of σ . Since Bρ is orthonormal,
the vectors
{
b⊗b∗ | b ∈ Bρ
}
are mutually orthogonal in ρ⊗ρ∗. Thus,
∑
b∈Bρ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ dimLσ .
Note that dimLσ is equal to dσ times the multiplicity of σ in ρ⊗ρ∗. On the other hand, we have
multiplicity of σ in ρ⊗ρ∗ = 〈χσ ,χρ χρ∗〉= 〈χσ χρ ,χρ∗〉
= multiplicity of ρ∗ in σ ⊗ρ
≤ dim(σ ⊗ρ)dimρ∗ = dσ ,
Hence,
∑
b∈Bρ
∥∥∥Πρ⊗ρ∗σ (b⊗b∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ d2σ .
B Rational Goppa codes
This part summarizes definitions and key properties of rational Goppa codes that would be useful in our
analysis. Following Stichtenoth [21], we shall describe Goppa codes in terms of algebraic function fields
instead of algebraic curves. A complete treatment for this subject can be found in [22].
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A rational function field over Fq is a field extension Fq(x)/Fq for some x transcendental over Fq. Each
element z ∈ Fq(x) can be viewed as a function whose evaluation at a base field element a ∈ Fq is determined
as follows: write z = f (x)/g(x) for some polynomials f (x),g(x) ∈ Fq[x], then
z(a) =
{ f (a)
g(a) ∈ Fq if g(a) 6= 0
∞ if g(a) = 0 .
A Rieman-Roch space4 in the rational function field Fq(x)/Fq is a subset of Fq of the form
L (r,g,h) =
{ f (x)g(x)
h(x)
∣∣∣ f (x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f (x) ≤ r}
for some nonzero polynomials g(x),h(x) ∈ K[x] and some integer r. Note that L (r,g,h) is a vector space of
dimension r+1 over Fq.
Definition. (A special case of Definition 2.2.1 in [22]) Let g(x),h(x) ∈ Fq[x] be nonzero coprime polyno-
mials, and let r < n a nonnegative integer. Let γ1, . . . ,γn be n distinct elements in the field5 Fq such that
g(γi) 6= 0 and h(γi) 6= 0 for all i. Then a rational Goppa code associated with g,h and γi’s is defined by
C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) def= {(z(γ1), . . . ,z(γn)) | z ∈L (r,g,h)} ⊂ Fnq .
Remark A classical binary Goppa code can be obtained by setting q = 2m, r = n− degg(x)− 1, and
h(x) = ∑nj=1 ∏i6= j(x− γi) and then intersecting the code C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) with the vector space Fn2 (see
[1]). Generalized Reed-Solomon codes are a special case of rational Goppa codes in which the polynomials
g(x) and h(x) are both constants.
Theorem 19. (A special case of Corollary 2.2.3 in [22]) The code defined in Definition B is an [n,k,d]-
linear code over Fq with dimension k = r+1 and minimum distance d ≥ n− r. Consequentially, this code
can correct at least (n− r−1)/2 errors.
The rational Goppa code C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) has a generator matrix:
M0 =

g(γ1)
h(γ1) . . .
g(γn)
h(γn)
γ1
g(γ1)
h(γ1) . . . γn
g(γn)
h(γn)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
γr1
g(γ1)
h(γ1) . . . γ
r
n
g(γn)
h(γn)
 .
Proposition 20. The matrix M0 has full rank, that is, its column rank equals r+1. Hence, every generator
matrix of a rational Goppa code has full rank.
4In terms of algebraic function fields, a Rieman-Roch space is defined in the association with a divisor of the function field F/K,
where a divisor is a finite sum ∑i niPi with ni ∈ Z and Pi’s being places of the function field. In the rational function field K(x)/K,
we can show that every divisor can be written as rP∞ +(z) for some integer r and some nonzero z ∈ K(x), where P∞ is the infinite
place (defined in [22, pg. 9]), and (z) is the principal divisor of z. The space L (r,g,h) is indeed the Rieman-Roch space associated
with the divisor rP∞ +(z) with z = h(x)/g(x).
5In the case r = degh(x)−deg g(x), one can choose one of the points Pi’s to be ∞. However, we rule out this case to keep the
discussion simple.
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Proof. It suffices to to show that the first r+ 1 columns of M0 are linearly independent. Equivalently, we
show that the matrix N0 below has nonzero determinant:
N0 =

g(γ1)
h(γ1) . . .
g(γr+1)
h(γr+1)
γ1
g(γ1)
h(γ1) . . . γr+1
g(γr+1)
h(γr+1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
γr1
g(γ1)
h(γ1) . . . γ
r
r+1
g(γr+1)
h(γr+1)
=

1 . . . 1
γ1 . . . γr+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
γr1 . . . γrr+1


g(γ1)
h(γ1)
.
.
.
g(γr+1)
h(γr+1)
 .
The first matrix in the above product is a Vandermonde matrix, which has nonzero determinant because γi’s
are distinct. The second matrix also has nonzero determinant because g(γi) 6= 0 for all i. Hence, N0 has
nonzero determinant.
An important property of rational Goppa codes is that in general their automorphisms are induced by
projective transformations of the projective line. We will make this precise below.
Definition. (See [23, pg. 53]) Let C be a code of length n. An automorphism of C is a permutation pi ∈ Sn
which maps every word in C to a word in C by acting on the positions of the codewords. The set of all
automorphisms of C forms a group called the automorphism group of C.
In particular, an automorphism of C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) is a permutation pi ∈ Sn such that
C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) = C (γpi(1), . . . ,γpi(n),r,g,h) .
Remark Suppose M is a generator matrix for an [n,k]-linear code C over Fq. Then a permutation pi ∈ Sn is
an automorphism of C if and only if there is an invertible matrix A ∈ GLk(Fq) such that AMPpi = Ppi , where
Ppi denotes the permutation matrix corresponding to pi . If M has full rank, there is exactly one such matrix
A for each automorphism pi of C.
Theorem 21 (Stichtenoth [21]). Suppose 1≤ r≤ n−3. Then the automorphism group of the rational Goppa
code C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) is isomorphic to a subgroup of Aut(Fq(x)/Fq).
Fact. The automorphism group of the rational function field Fq(x)/Fq is isomorphic to the projective linear
group over Fq. In notations, Aut(Fq(x)/Fq)≃ PGL2(Fq).
Let C = C (γ1, . . . ,γn,r,g,h) be a rational Goppa code. To give an intuition for how the automorphism
group of C is embedded in PGL2(Fq), consider a transformation σ ∈ PGL2(Fq) and view each element
a ∈ Fq as the projective line [a : 1] (the point at infinity is written as [1 : 0]). Suppose σ transforms [a : 1] to
the projective line [b : 1], then we shall write σa = b. If σ transforms each line [γi : 1] to some line [γ j : 1],
then σ induces another rational Goppa code:
C (σγ1, . . . ,σγn,r,g,h) .
If, further, C (σγ1, . . . ,σγn,r,g,h) equals the original code C, then σ induces an automorphism of C. Stichtenoth’s
theorem establishes that every automorphism of C is induced by such a transformation in PGL2(Fq).
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C Supplemental proofs for GL2(Fq)
C.1 Irreducible representations of GL2(Fq)
In this part, we will first present a preliminary background on the structure of GL2(Fq) followed by descrip-
tion of its irreps. We refer readers to [4, §5.2] for the missing technical details in this part.
Viewing GL2(Fq) as the group of all Fq-linear invertible endomorphisms of the quadratic extension Fq2
of Fq, we have a large subgroup of GL2(Fq) that is isomorphic to F∗q2 via the identification:{
fξ | ξ ∈ F∗q2
}
≃ F∗q2 , fξ ↔ ξ
where fξ : Fq2 → Fq2 is the Fq-linear map given by fξ (ν) = ξ ν for all ν ∈ Fq2 .
To turn each map fξ into a matrix form, we fix a basis {1,γ} of Fq2 as a vector space over Fq. For each
ξ ∈ Fq2 , writing ξ = ξx,y = x+ γy for some x,y ∈ Fq, then the map fξ corresponds to the matrix
(
x γ2y
y x
)
,
since fξ (1) = x+ γy and fξ (γ) = γ2y+ γx. Hence, we can rewrite the above identification as{(
x γ2y
y x
)
| x,y ∈ Fq,x 6= 0 or y 6= 0
}
≃ F∗q2 ,
(
x γ2y
y x
)
↔ ξx,y = x+ γy .
For example, if q is odd, choose a generator ε of F∗q, then ε must be non-square in Fq, which implies
that
{
1,
√
ε
}
form a basis of Fq2 as a vector space over Fq. In such a case, we can define ξx,y = x+ y√ε .
Conjugacy classes. Group GL2(Fq) has four types of conjugacy classes in Table C.1, with representatives
described as follows:
ax =
(
x 0
0 x
)
bx =
(
x 1
0 x
)
cx,y =
(
x 0
0 y
)
dx,y =
(
x γ2y
y x
)
class [ax] [bx] [cx,y] = [cy,x] [dx,y] = [dx,−y]
x ∈ F∗q x ∈ F∗q x,y ∈ F∗q,x 6= y x ∈ Fq,y ∈ F∗q
class size 1 q2−1 q2 +q q2−q
no. of classes q−1 q−1 (q−1)(q−2)2 q(q−1)2
Table 1: Conjugacy classes of GL2(Fq), where [g] denotes the class of representative g.
There are q2− 1 conjugacy classes, hence there are exactly q2− 1 irreps of GL2(Fq). We shall briefly
describe below how to construct all those representations.
Linear representations. For each character α :F∗q→C∗ of the cyclic group F∗q, we have a one-dimensional
representation Uα of GL2(Fq) defined by:
Uα(g) = α(det(g)) ∀g ∈ GL(2,q) .
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To compute Uα(dx,y), we shall use the following fact:
det
(
x γ2y
y x
)
= NormFq2/Fq(ξx,y) = ξx,y ·ξ qx,y = ξ q+1x,y .
Recall that there are q− 1 characters of F∗q = 〈ε〉 corresponding to q− 1 places where the generator ε can
be sent to. The linear representation Uα0 , where α0 is the character sending ε to 1, is indeed the trivial
representation, denoted U .
Irreducible representations by action on P1(Fq). GL2(Fq) acts transitively on the projective line P1(Fq)
in the natural way: (
a b
c d
)
· [x : y] =
(
a b
c d
)[
x
y
]
= [ax+by : cx+dy] ,
in which the stabilizer of the infinite point [1 : 0] is the Borel subgroup B:
B =
{(
a b
0 d
)
| a,d ∈ F∗q, b ∈ Fq
}
.
The permutation representation of GL2(Fq) given by this action on P1(Fq) has dimension q+ 1 and
decomposes into the trivial representation U and a q-dimensional representation V . The character of V is
given as follows:
χV (ax) = q χV (bx) = 0 χV (cx,y) = 1 χV (dx,y) =−1 .
By checking 〈χV ,χV 〉= 1, we see that V is irreducible. Hence, for each of the q−1 characters α of F∗q, we
have a q-dimensional irrep Vα =V ⊗Uα . Note that V =V ⊗U .
Irreducible representations induced from Borel subgroup B. For each pair of characters α ,β of F∗q,
there is a character of the subgroup B:
φα ,β : B→ C∗ by
(
a b
0 d
)
7→ α(a)β (d) .
In other words, φα ,β is a one-dimensional representation of subgroup B. Let Wα ,β be the representation of
GL2(Fq) induced by φα ,β . By computing characters, we have
• Wα ,β =Wβ ,α ,
• Wα ,α =Uα ⊕Vα , and
• Wα ,β is irreducible for α 6= β . Each of these representations has dimension equal the index of B in
GL2(Fq), i.e., [GL(2,q) : B] = q+1.
There are ((q−1)2− (q−1))/2 = (q−1)(q−2)/2 distinct irreps of this type.
Irreducible representations by characters of F∗q2 . Let ϕ : F
∗
q2 → C∗ be a character of the cyclic group
F∗q2 . Since F
∗
q2 can be viewed as a subgroup of GL2(Fq), we have the induced representation Indϕ , which is
not irreducible. However, it gives us a (q−1)-dimensional irrep with character given by
χϕ = χV⊗Wα,1 − χWα,1 − χIndϕ if ϕ |F∗q = α .
Note that Indϕ ≃ Indϕq, thus Xϕ ≃ Xϕq . So, the characters ϕ of F∗q2 with ϕ 6= ϕq give a rise to the 12q(q−1)
remaining irreps of GL2(Fq).
A summary of all irreducible characters of GL2(Fq) is given in Table C.1 below.
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ρ dρ χρ(ax) χρ(bx) χρ(cx,y) χρ(dx,y)
Uα 1 α(x2) α(x2) α(xy) α(ξ q+1x,y )
Vα q qα(x2) 0 α(xy) −α(ξ q+1x,y )
Wα ,β (α 6= β ) q+1 (q+1)α(x)β (x) α(x)β (x) α(x)β (y)+α(y)β (x) 0
Xϕ q−1 (q−1)ϕ(x) −ϕ(x) 0 −(ϕ(ξx,y)+ϕ(ξ qx,y))
Table 2: Character table of GL2(Fq), where α ,β are characters of F∗q, and ϕ is a character of
F∗q2 with ϕ
q 6= ϕ , and dρ = χρ(a1) is the dimension of ρ .
C.2 Proof of Lemma 11
In the remaining of this section, we devote to prove Lemma 11, which states that there are at most two
linear representations appearing in the decomposition of ρ ⊗ρ∗, for any irrep ρ of GL2(Fq). Obviously, if
ρ is linear then ρ ⊗ρ∗ is the trivial representation. Therefore, we shall only consider the cases where ρ is
non-linear.
Recall that the multiplicity of Uα in ρ⊗ρ∗ is given by〈
χρ⊗ρ∗ ,χUα
〉
=
1
|G| ∑g∈G |χρ(g)|
2χUα (g) =
1
|G|(A(ρ ,α)+B(ρ ,α)+C(ρ ,α)+D(ρ ,α)) ,
where A(ρ ,α),B(ρ ,α),C(ρ ,α),D(ρ ,α)) are the sum of |χρ(g)|2χUα (g) over all element g in the conjugacy
classes with representatives of the form ax,bx,cx,y and dx,y, respectively. That is, from the description of
conjugacy classes in Table C.1,
A(ρ ,α) = ∑
x∈F∗q
|χρ(ax)|2χUα (ax)
B(ρ ,α) = (q2−1) ∑
x∈F∗q
|χρ(bx)|2χUα (bx)
C(ρ ,α) = 1
2
(q2 +q) ∑
x,y∈F∗q ,x6=y
|χρ(cx,y)|2χUα (cx,y)
D(ρ ,α) = 1
2
(q2−q) ∑
x,y∈Fq ,y6=0
|χρ(dx,y)|2χUα (dx,y) .
Our goal below will be to show that
〈
χρ⊗ρ∗ ,χUα
〉
= 0 for all but two linear representations Uα and for
all non-linear irrep ρ of GL2(Fq). We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 22. Let F be a finite field and φ : F×→ C∗ be a non-trivial character of the cyclic group F×, i.e.,
φ(x) 6= 1 for some x. Then ∑x∈F× φ(x) = 0.
Proof. Let n be the order of F× and let τ be a generator of F×. Then τn = 1 which implies φ(τ)n = 1. Since
φ is non-trivial, we must have φ(τ) 6= 1. Hence,
∑
x∈F×
φ(x) =
n−1
∑
k=0
φ(τk) =
n−1
∑
k=0
φ(τ)k = φ(τ)
n−1
φ(τ)−1 = 0 .
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Note that for any character α of F∗q, the map α2 : F∗q → C∗ defined by α2(x) = α(x2) is also a character
of F∗q. Hence, we have the following direct corollaries of Lemma 22.
Corollary 23. Let α be a character of F∗q such that α2 is non-trivial. Then ∑x∈F∗q α(x2) = 0.
Corollary 24. Let ρ be an irrep of GL2(Fq) and let α be a character of F∗q such that α2 is non-trivial. Then
we always have A(ρ ,α) = B(ρ ,α) = 0.
Proof. Observe that |χρ(ax)| and |χρ(bx)| do not depend on x, and χUα (ax) = χUα (bx) = α(x2). Hence, to
show A(ρ ,α) = B(ρ ,α) = 0, it suffices to use the fact that ∑x∈F∗q α(x2) = 0.
Remark There are at most two characters α of F∗q such that α2 is trivial. They are the trivial one, and
the one that maps ε → ω q−12 if q is odd, where ω = e 2piiq−1 is a primitive (q− 1)th root of unity, and ε is a
chosen generator of the cyclic group F∗q. To see this, suppose α(ε) = ωk, for some k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,q−2}. If
α(ε)2 = 1, then ω2k = 1, which implies q−1 | 2k because ω has order q−1. Hence 2k ∈ {0,q−1}.
With this remark, Lemma 11 will immediately follows Lemma 25 below.
Lemma 25. Let ρ be a non-linear irrep of GL2(Fq) and let α be a character of F∗q such that α2 is trivial.
Then Uα does not appear in the decomposition of ρ⊗ρ∗.
Proof. We will prove case by case of ρ that C(ρ ,α) = D(ρ ,α) = 0, which, together with Corollary 24, will
complete the proof for the lemma.
Case ρ =Wβ ,β ′ . For this case, as |χWβ ,β ′ (dx,y)| = 0, we only need to show C(Wβ ,β ′ ,α) = 0. Considering
x,y ∈ F∗q with x 6= y and letting z = x−1y 6= 1, we have
|χWβ ,β ′ (cx,y)|2 = [β (x)β ′(y)+β (y)β ′(x)][β (x−1)β ′(y−1)+β (y−1)β ′(x−1)]
= 2+β (xy−1)β ′(yx−1)+β (yx−1)β ′(xy−1)
= 2+β (z−1)β ′(z)+β (z)β ′(z−1)
This means |χWβ ,β ′ (cx,y)|2 only depends on z = x−1y. Now let γ(z) = |χWβ ,β ′ (cx,y)|2α(z), we have
|χWβ ,β ′ (cx,y)|2χUα (cx,y) = |χWβ ,β ′ (cx,y)|2α(x2z) = γ(z)α(x2).
Hence,
∑
x,y∈F∗q ,x6=y
|χρ(cx,y)|2χUα (cx,y) = ∑
x,z∈F∗q,z 6=1
γ(z)α(x2)
=
 ∑
x∈F∗q
α(x2)
 ∑
z∈F∗q,z 6=1
γ(z)
 = 0
by Corollary 23, completing the proof for the case ρ =Wβ ,β ′ .
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Case ρ =Vβ . Since |χVβ (cx,y)|= 1 and χUα (cx,y) = α(xy) = α(x)α(y),
∑
x,y∈F∗q ,x6=y
|χVβ (cx,y)|2χUα (cx,y) = ∑
x,y∈F∗q ,x6=y
α(x)α(y) =
 ∑
x∈F∗q
α(x)
2− ∑
x∈F∗q
α(x2) = 0
by Lemma 22 and Corollary 23. This shows C(Vβ ,α) = 0.
Now we are going to show that D(Vβ ,α) = 0, or equivalently, ∑x,y∈Fq,y6=0 α(ξ q+1x,y ) = 0. We have
∑
ξ∈F∗
q2
α(ξ q+1) = ∑
x,y∈Fq ,y6=0
α(ξ q+1x,y )+ ∑
x∈F∗q
α(ξ q+1x,0 ) = ∑
x,y∈Fq ,y6=0
α(ξ q+1x,y ) .
where in the last equality, we apply Corollary 23 and the fact that ξ q+1x,0 = xq+1 = x2 for all x ∈ F∗q.
Consider the map φ : F∗q2 → C∗ given by φ(ξ ) = α(ξ q+1). Clearly, φ is a character of F∗q2 . Since α2 is
non-trivial and α2(x) = α(x2) = α(xq+1) = φ(x) for all x ∈ F∗q, the map φ is also non-trivial. By Lemma
22, we have ∑ξ∈F∗
q2
α(ξ q+1) = 0 , which implies D(Vβ ,α) = 0.
Case ρ = Xϕ . As it is clear from the character table of GL2(Fq) that C(Xϕ ,α) = 0, it remains to show
D(Xϕ ,α) = 0, or equivalently, D0
def
= ∑x,y∈Fq,y6=0 |ϕ(ξx,y)+ϕ(ξ qx,y)|2α(ξ q+1x,y ) = 0. We have
D0 = ∑
ξ∈F∗
q2
|ϕ(ξ )+ϕ(ξ q)|2α(ξ q+1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D1
− ∑
x∈F∗q
|ϕ(ξx,0)+ϕ(ξ qx,0)|2α(ξ q+1x,0 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2
.
For ξ ∈ F∗q2 , we have
|ϕ(ξ )+ϕ(ξ q)|2 = (ϕ(ξ )+ϕ(ξ q))(ϕ(ξ )−1 +ϕ(ξ q)−1) = 2+ϕ(ξ q−1)+ϕ(ξ 1−q) .
Hence, since xq−1 = 1 for all x ∈ F∗q and by Corollary 23,
D2 = ∑
x∈F∗q
(2+ϕ(xq−1)+ϕ(x1−q))α(xq+1) = 3 ∑
x∈F∗q
α(x2) = 0 .
The last thing we want to show is that D1 = 0. Consider the map φ :F∗q2 →C∗ given by φ(ξ )=ϕ(ξ q−1)α(ξ q+1),
which is apparently a character of F∗q2 . We shall see that it is non-trivial. Let ω be a generator of F
∗
q2 .
Since ωq2−1 = 1, we have φ(ωq+1) = α(ω(q+1)2) = α(ω2(q+1)) = α2(ωq+1). On the other hand, ωq+1
is a generator for F∗q, because ωk(q+1) with k = 0,1, . . . ,q− 2 are distinct, and ω(q−1)(q+1) = 1. Hence, if
φ(ωq+1) = 1, then α2(x) = 1 for all x ∈ F∗q. But since α2 is non-trivial, we must have φ(ωq+1) 6= 1, which
means φ is non-trivial. Applying Lemma 22, we get ∑ξ∈F∗
q2
ϕ(ξ q−1)α(ξ q+1) = 0 . Similarly, we also have
∑ξ∈F∗
q2
ϕ(ξ 1−q)α(ξ q+1) = 0 . Combining with the fact that ∑ξ∈F∗
q2
α(ξ q+1) = 0 , which has been proved in
the previous case, we have shown D1 = 0, completing the proof.
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